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EX PARTE COMMUNICATION IN INFORMAL
RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Michael E. Ornoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, a controversy has arisen, particularly
among different panels of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, regarding the use of ex parte
communications 1 in informal administrative rulemaking. Numer-
ous theories for extending such a prohibition beyond the express
language of the Administrative Procedures Act 2 have been ad-
vanced in recent judicial opinions.
The problem of ex parte influence upon administrative decision-
making is not, however, of recent vintage. As early as 1958 the
Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce discovered that a presidential
assistant had exerted influences upon the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. In the twelve year period following, at least seven other con-
gressional investigations considered ex parte influences upon ad-
ministrative agencies.3
* B.A., Randolph-Macon College, 1976; J.D., University of Richmond, 1980; Associate,
Taylor, Hazen, Kauffman, Lipscomb & Smith, Richmond, Virginia.
1. Generally, ex parte communications or contacts refer to "[ijnterested attempts 'to in-
fluence any member of [a decision-making body] except by the recognized and public
processes."' Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221, 224 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), (quoting Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 66 (D.C. Cir.
1958)). The Administrative Procedures Act [hereinafter cited as APA] states that" 'ex parte
communication' means an oral or written communication not on the public record with re-
spect to which reasonable prior notice to all parties is not given. . .." 5 U.S.C. § 551 (14)
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976). See also Federal Communica-
tions Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure, Subpart H-Ex Parte Presentations, 47
C.F.R. § 1.1201(g) (1979).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976) [hereinafter cited as APA].
3. 2 K. DAvis, ADI a TnvE LAw TRATISE § 13.12, at 465 (1970 Supp.) [hereinafter
cited as K. DAvis I].
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II. Sangamon Valley: CONFLICTING PRIVATE CLAIMS TO A
VALUABLE PRIVILEGE
The forerunner of judicial efforts to prohibit ex parte communi-
cations with agency decisionmakers was Sangamon Valley Televi-
sion Corp. v. United States.4 In that case, the District of Columbia
Circuit reviewed the allocation of television channels by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. Following an earlier review by
that court and while on appeal before the Supreme Court, the exis-
tence of widespread ex parte contacts was discovered.5
Prior to commencement of the original proceedings before the
FCC, all of the contending television companies had been given
notice that the Commission would receive written comments on or
before a designated date and that a reply comment period of
fifteen days would follow. The notice further provided that "[n]o
additional comments may be filed unless (1) specifically requested
by the Commission or (2) good cause for filing such additional
comments is established."6 Nonetheless, widespread attempts were
made to influence the Commissioners.7
4. 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
5. The court had earlier refused to grant relief to the petitioner who attacked the channel
allocation as inconsistent with Section 307(b) of the Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1083
(1934), as amended by 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1952), which mandated "such distribution of
licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several States and com-
munities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of
the same." The lower court had found nothing illegal in the Commission's decision. Sanga-
mon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 255 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment and remanded the case because of al-
leged ex parte contacts with Commissioners discovered subsequent to the Court of Appeals
decision and brought to the attention of the Court by the Solicitor General. Sangamon Val-
ley Television Corp. v. United States, 358 U.S. 49 (1958) (per curiam).
6. 269 F.2d at 223. These practices regarding receipt of comments prior to a decision,
together with an ex parte prohibition were adopted as part of the Commission's Procedural
Practices and Rules on December 11, 1957. For the current rules on this subject, see 47
C.F.R. § 1.415 (1979).
7. This fact is poignantly suggested by the following:
Harry Tenenbaum, president of intervenor Signal Hill, admitted ... that while the
proceeding... was pending he spoke to [Commission] members individually 'in pri-
vacy in their offices, not while they were sitting in a body as the Commission', of his
desire to have Channel 2 .... He was 'in all the Commissioners' offices' and went
'from Commissioner to Commissioner'. He 'probably discussed' with every Commis-
sioner his desire to have Channel 2 .... [H]e had every Commissioner at one time or
another as his luncheon guest, and ... gave turkeys to every Commissioner in 1955
and in 1956.
EX PARTE COMMUNICATION
The Sangamon Valley opinion, vacating the FCC's decision, ap-
pears at first glance to be a broad based condemnation of ex parte
contacts of any kind regardless of the type of administrative action
undertaken. This conclusion is due primarily to the court's rejec-
tion of the argument of the Commission and intervenors that the
ex parte contacts did not invalidate the decision since channel allo-
cations were rulemaking proceedings, governed by section 553,
rather than adjudications governed by section 554, of the APA.8
The court ultimately adopted the position maintained by the De-
partment of Justice:
[W]hatever the proceeding may be called it involved not only allo-
cation of TV channels among communities but also resolution of
conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege, and that basic
fairness requires such a proceeding to be carried on in the
open .... Accordingly the private approaches to the members of
the Commission vitiated its action .... 9
The court opined that the purpose underlying the Commis-
sion's announced procedures was to prevent parties from making
contentions off-the-record which were prohibited on-the-record,
thereby insuring that only material of record would be considered
in reaching the final decision.10 Consequently, the channel alloca-
tion was vacated and remanded to the Commission with instruc-
tions to hold evidential hearings to determine the nature and scope
of the improper contacts.
The significance of the court's Sangamon Valley opinion lies in
its adoption of the "conflicting private claims to a valuable privi-
lege" standard to trigger prohibitions against ex parte influence. As
will be developed later in this comment, where this standard is
[.. S]even weeks after the cut-off date ... for filing reply comments and ten
days before the Commission decided the case, Tenenbaum sent each Commissioner a
letter in which he contended and tried to prove that 'Channel 2, based in St. Louis,
would reach 166,700 more homes in the state of Illinois than if it were based in
Springfield, Illinois.'
269 F.2d at 223-24. See also id. at 224 n.3.
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (1976).
9. 269 F.2d at 224 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 225. The regulations subsequently adopted by the Commission expressly man-
date a final decision based on comments and material of record. 47 C.F.R. § 1.425 (1979)
(originally adopted as 47 C.F.R. § 1.218 (1958)).
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met, the court will apply the prohibition regardless of the type of
agency action" even in the face of express Congressional intent to
the contrary. 1
2
Two subsequent cases appear to clarify the extent to which the
court was willing to apply an ex parte prohibition in other types of
agency action. The first of these cases, Courtaulds (Alabama) Inc.
v. Dixon,1 3 involved the Federal Trade Commission's promulgation
of rules under the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act.1 4 Ap-
pellant sought to invalidate the rules because of ex parte material
received by the Commission from producers of other fibers includ-
ing appellant's competitors. The material received related to the
proposed definition of rayon and to appellant's application for a
separate generic name.15
In rejecting the challenge, the court noted that "[i]nterested par-
ties, including appellant, were invited to present suggestions" 6 and
that the Commission staff had conducted numerous conferences
with interested and informed parties.1 7 The court found no evi-
dence that anything had been done in secret or that any interested
party had received advantages not shared by all. Generally, the
11. Professor Davis has pointed out that Sangamon Valley "was primarily rulemaking
and incidentally adjudication." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 6:18, at 534
(2d ed. 1978) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as K. DAVIS II].
12. See notes 28-39 infra and accompanying text.
13. 294 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (1960). The FTC had promulgated rules establishing generic
names for manufactured fibers including rayon. Appellant unsuccessfully sought to have its
new "cross-linked cellulosic fiber" designated under the generic name "lincron" rather than
rayon. 294 F.2d at 900, 902.
15. Id. at 904 n.14.
16. Id. at 904.
17. In certain proceedings, contacts of this nature were condoned in the recommendations
of the temporary Administrative Conference of the United States, 1961-62, which urged
adoption of a prohibition against ex parte contacts in certain administrative actions. Pro-
fessor Davis observes:
The recommendations do not apply to any administrative action other than on-the-
record proceedings. They do not ... affect informal adjudication. Informality does
and should mean ex parte contacts. Parties must be free to persuade agency mem-
bers and staff members, and persuasion includes influence and pressure .... In any
rule making which is not done through [an on-the-record] proceeding, ex parte con-
tacts are usually affirmatively desirable, for they help the administrators to know
what affected parties want .... We want democratic influences on administration
and the principal channel of such influences is ex parte contacts.
K. DAVIS I, supra note 3, § 13.12, at 467-68 (emphasis added).
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court was greatly deferential toward the Commission's action for
"it may have considered representations from many sources and
then rejected whatever was deemed inapropos." I5
The Courtaulds opinion, however, becomes significant by way of
a footnote reference which distinguishes that case from Sangamon
Valley. By showing what was not at issue in Courtaulds, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has apparently clarified the standard
enunciated in the earlier case.
[Sangamon Valley] is completely distinguishable on its facts and in
principle. The instant case in no way involves a license to be avail-
able to only one competing applicant nor is there a suggestion here
of what 'competitors' are advantaged by the Commission's adoption
of the broad generic category 'rayon.' Moreover, the instant pro-
ceeding clearly was one of rule making, both in form and in sub-
stance, and hence was not subject to all the restrictions applicable to
a quasi-judicial hearing.19
Thus, Courtaulds would seem to suggest that the Sangamon
Valley standard for triggering the ex parte prohibition is to be
strictly construed. In the absence of a privilege sought by two or
more interested parties to the exclusion of others, the prohibition
seems inapplicable according to Courtaulds. That opinion seems to
say more, however, for it appears that the greater the tendency of
agency action to decide an issue between two or more parties, i.e.,
where the action is more akin to an adjudication affecting only the
rights of those parties before the agency, rather than a determina-
tion of regulations of general applicability, the greater will be the
procedural protections afforded by the judiciary.20 The rule of
Sangamon Valley, therefore, seems all the more defined: regardless
18. 294 F.2d at 904 (emphasis in original).
19. Id. at 904-05 n.16 (emphasis added).
20. "Professor Davis, in particular, has urged that the appropriate test should be the
character of the factual issues involved: adjudicative or particularized factual issues should
be resolved in adjudicatory proceedings; general or legislative facts should be resolved in a
legislative type proceedings [sic]." Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte
Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REv. 377, 383 (1978).
Recall that the court in vacating the FCC's decision in Sangamon Valley stated that the
ex parte contacts went "to the very core of the Commission's quasi-judicial powers ......
269 F.2d at 224 (emphasis added).
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of the form of agency action, if it involves competing private claims
to a valuable privilege, ex parte communications are prohibited.
A year following Courtaulds, the District of Columbia Circuit
decided United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board.21 That
case reviewed the Civil Aeronautics Board's award of non-stop air
service to a particular airline, a single competitor for an exclusive
right. Clearly, the agency action was one of adjudication rather
than rulemaking.22
Unlike the Sangamon Valley panel, the United Air Lines court
affirmed the Board's decision, finding that the ex parte communi-
cations did not amount to a "'corrupt tampering with the adjudi-
catory process itself.' ",23 The court distinguished the case from
Sangamon Valley by reason of the fact that, in the latter case, ex
parte communications were made directly to members of the de-
ciding body without the knowledge of other parties. In the case
before the court, although the airline had violated the Board's
Principles of Practice by soliciting support from civic bodies, travel
agents, the press, and members of Congress in the form of commu-
nications to the Board, most important communications were
placed in the public file and were available to other competing
parties.24
By judicial decision, then, the District of Columbia Circuit has
established a prohibition against ex parte contacts with adminis-
trative decisionmakers. Thus, where allegations of ex parte con-
tacts are made, the court first must determine whether the deci-
sion of the agency is one resolving "conflicting private claims to a
valuable privilege." Assuming that standard is met, further analy-
21. 309 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The court had previously remanded the case to the
Board for a determination of whether ex parte contacts so violated the Board's rules as to
require its order to be vacated. After the Board had determined that no significant violation
existed, a competing applicant for the non-stop air service route sought review in the court
of appeals.
22. See K. DAvIs II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 534.
23. 309 F.2d at 241 (quoting WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375, 383 cert. denied sub nor
Public Serv. Television, Inc. v. FCC, 368 U.S. 841 (1961)).
24. 309 F.2d at 241. It should also be noted that the court could not find that the Board's
award of the route to the airline was without adequate support in the record. This factor is
important in later cases, particularly Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). See notes 45-63 infra and accompanying text.
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sis must find that the ex parte communications were conducted
secretly, that is, without the knowledge of other parties in interest.
I[I. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION: THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE
ACT
The temporary Administrative Conference of' the United
States in 1962 made recommendations regarding ex parte commu-
nications. Although the conference found that a single, general
prohibition applicable to all administrative agencies was not feasi-
ble, it did establish certain principles to guide agencies in estab-
lishing their own rules. The most significant of these principles was
Recommendation No. 16:
The agency code should prohibit any person who is a party to, or an
agent of a party to, or who intercedes in an on-the-record proceed-
ing in any agency, from making an unauthorized ex parte communi-
cation about the proceeding to any agency member, hearing officer,
or agency employee participating in the decision in the proceeding.25
Whether agency action was required to be made "on-the-record"
would be determined by the Constitution, statute, agency rule, or
agency order in particular cases. The prohibition would be effective
from the time the agency gave notice that an on-the-record pro-
ceeding was to be held. The recommendation also provided that
where ex parte communications were made, they were to be in-
cluded in the public record so as to be subject to rebuttal.2 Fol-
lowing the recommendation of the temporary Administrative Con-
ference, several federal administrative agencies adopted rules
prohibiting certain ex parte communications.27
25. RECOMMENDATION No. 16, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 6 (1963), quoted in K.
DAVIS I, supra note 3, § 13.12 at 467.
26. K. DAviS I, supra note 3, § 13.12, at 467. The recommendation also provided for lim-
ited exceptions to the ex parte prohibition. These included: (1) communications regarding a
matter which is authorized to be handled on an ex parte basis; (2) requests regarding the
status of a proceeding; (3) communications which parties to the proceeding have agreed or
which agency rules permit on an ex parte basis; (4) communications of general significance if
the party offering the information cannot reasonably expect to know that it is material to
issues being considered in on-the-record proceedings; and (5) communications made pursu-
ant to agency rules which are promptly available to all interested parties. L. JAFFE & N.
NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 993-94 (3d ed. 1968).
27. Even after passage of the Government in the Sunshine Act amendments to the APA,
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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:73
The Administrative Procedures Act, as originally enacted, con-
tained no explicit ban on ex parte communications" other than a
prohibition imposed upon the agency "employee who presides at
the reception of evidence" in on-the-record proceedings. 2 In fact,
the Attorney General's Manual on the APA, commenting on sec-
tion 553, affirmatively supported the use of ex parte communica-
tions in informal rulemaking: "'Such informal rule-making proce-
dure may take a variety of forms: informal hearings (with or
without a stenographed transcript), conferences, consultation with
industry committees, submission of written views, or any combina-
tion of these.' "0 Section 553 of the APA on its face, in its history,
discussed in notes 32-39 infra and accompanying text, many federal agencies continue to
maintain rules, regulations, and procedures for dealing with ex parte contacts. See, e.g.,
CAB Procedural Regulations, Part 300-Rules of Conduct in Board Proceedings, 14 C.F.R.
§§ 300.0-.20 (1980); SEC Rules, Subpart F-Code of Behavior Governing Ex Parte Commu-
nications Between Persons Outside the Commission and Decisional Employees, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 200.110-.114 (1980); NLRB Rules and Regulations, Subpart P-Ex Parte Communica-
tions, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.126-.133 (1979); Federal Maritime Commission Rules of Practice and
Procedure, 46 C.F.R. § 502.11(b) (1979); FCC Rules of Practice and Procedure, Subpart
H-Ex Parte Presentations, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1201-.1251 (1979); ICC General Rules and Regu-
lations, 49 C.F.R. § 1000.735-19 (1979), and Rules of Practice and Procedure, 49 C.F.R.
§ 1100, Appendix C-Ex Parte Communications at 291-92 (1979).
28. Nathanson, supra note 20, at 389. Originally, formal adversarial hearings in rulemak-
ing proceedings were required under sections 556 and 557 of the APA only when mandated
by statute or by due process. Otherwise, the limited procedural requirements of section 553
were applicable in rulemaking proceedings. The requirements of that section were two-fold:
(1) publication of general notice of rulemaking, and (2) an opportunity for interested per-
sons to participate. Under section 553, the opportunity to participate is limited to the "sub-
mission of written data, views, or arguments with or without the opportunity for oral pres-
entation." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
Conceivably this could have been interpreted to mean that all submissions, whether
written or oral, were to be included in a public file to be available to the general
public for inspection. There is, however, no affirmative support for this interpretation
in the legislative history, nor was there any early practice by the agencies to conform
with such an interpretation.
Nathanson, supra note 20, at 388. See also H. R. REP. No. 880, Part 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1976).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1966).
30. Nathanson, supra note 20, at 389 (quoting UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 31 (1947)). The
Manual states further that:
fi]t is entirely clear, however, that section [553] does not require the formulation of
rules upon the exclusive basis of any 'record' made in informal rule-making proceed-
ings .... Accordingly, except in formal rule-making governed by sections [556 and
557], an agency is free to formulate rules upon the basis of materials in its files and
the knowledge and experience of the agency, in addition to the materials adduced in
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and in its interpretation, seems entirely consistent with the per-
missive use of ex parte communications. 31
In 1976, Congress, recognizing the need for a statutory prohibi-
tion on ex parte contacts,3 2 enacted the Government in the Sun-
shine Act.33 Section 4 of the Act amended the APA by adding an
explicit prohibition against ex parte communications.3 4
The prohibition enacted, however, both by its language and by
Congressional intent, is limited to formal agency action. It is appli-
cable only when an agency decision is "required by statute" to be
made or determined "on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing. '3 5 As the Conference Committee Report noted, the ex
public rule-making proceedings.
Nathanson, supra note 20, at 389.
31. Nathanson, supra note 20, at 389.
32. Section 4 [of the Government in the Sunshine Act] would establish for the first time a
definite, general statutory statement as to the limitations and procedures governing
ex parte communications with respect to agency proceedings. At present, such limita-
tions and procedures are governed by agency rules and by constitutional standards,
neither of which have the clarity, uniformity, and general public availability of a
statute.
H.R. REP. No. 880, Part 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976).
33. Pub. L. No. 409, § 4(b), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976) (codified as 5 U.S.C. § 551(14); Pub. L.
No. 409, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1246 (1976) (codified as 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)).
34. The Sunshine Act added the following language as subsection (d) of § 557:
(d)(1) In any agency proceeding which is subject to subsection (a) of this section [i.e.
where sections 553 or 554 require a decision to be made 'on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing'], except to the extent required for the disposition of ex
parte matters as authorized by law -
(A) no interested person outside the agency shall make or knowingly cause to be
made to any member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge,
or other employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the
decisional process of the proceeding, an ex parte communication [as defined in 5
U.S.C. § 551(14)] relevant to the merits of the proceeding;
(B) no member of the body comprising the agency ... who is or may reasonably be
expected to be involved in the decisional process. . . shall make. . . to any inter-
ested person outside the agency an ex parte communication relevant to the merits
of the proceeding.
5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1976).
Section 557(d)(1)(C) requires that written ex parte communications, memoranda stating
the substance of oral contacts, and all responses thereto be placed in the public record.
When an ex parte communication is received, the agency may require the party making the
communication "to show cause why his claim or interest in the proceeding should not be
dismissed, denied, disregarded, or otherwise adversely affected on account of such viola-
tion." 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(D) (1976).
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 557(a) and (d)(1), 556(a), 553(c), 554(a) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 880, Part 1,
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parte prohibition of the Sunshine Act in no way prohibits "any
communication with an agency decisionmaking official if not in-
volving a formal adjudicatory proceeding (and a few formal
rulemaking proceedings)." 6 Particularly noteworthy is the fact
that, with one exception, none of the bills which eventually led to
the adoption of the Sunshine Act would have prohibited ex parte
communications in informal agency rulemaking under section 553
of the APA.3" The Sunshine Act amendments to the APA were in-
tended simply to clarify by statute the prohibition against ex parte
contacts and were not intended to repeal or modify, but rather to
supplement, the ex parte rules previously adopted by federal
agencies.3 8
The history surrounding the development of legislative prohibi-
tions of ex parte communications makes clear the fact that neither
the temporary Administrative Conference in 1961-62 nor the Con-
gress in 1976 intended to alter procedures employed by federal
agencies in informal rulemaking. "Congress thus has clearly de-
cided to restrict ex parte communications in 'on the record' pro-
ceedings and not in other proceedings, and what Congress has de-
cided is clearly the governing law. .... 39
IV. Home Box Office: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT DISREGARDED
The informal procedures employed by administrative agencies
under section 553 of the APA have not been free from criticism.
The basic complaint lies in the informality of the procedures, for
parties feel they have been denied an effective voice due to the fact
that their "opportunity to participate" is often limited to the sub-
mission of written comments. The complaint is founded upon the
uncertainty as to whether their comments are read or considered.
Participation is further undermined by the absence of a right to
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976).
36. H. R. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976). See also H. R. REP. No. 880, Part
2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) stating that "informal rulemaking proceedings. . . will not
be affected by the provision."
37. Nathanson, supra note 20, at 390.
38. H. R. REP. No. 880, Part 2, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976).
39. K. DAVIS II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 533. Davis cites Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) as the one exception to the governing law; this case "may be
momentarily the law of the D.C. Circuit." K. DAVIS II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 533.
[Vol. 15:73
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make oral presentations or to cross-examine opponents.40
Another complaint asserted is the lack of a requirement that
agencies assemble a formal record."1 Without a formalized record
similar to that required in "on the record" rulemaking or agency
adjudication, meaningful judicial review is circumvented, thereby
making difficult any attack upon the accuracy of the agency's
decision. 2
The judiciary has responded to these criticisms through two
opposite, yet concurrent, movements. On the one hand, courts have
held that the procedures established by the APA are sufficient to
protect the due process rights of the parties in informal agency
proceedings and to provide an adequate record for judicial re-
view. 43 On the other hand, some courts have imposed traditionally
adjudicatory procedures upon the process of informal rule-
making.
4 4
These competing viewpoints have come to clash in the area of ex
parte contacts. Foremost among the cases imposing traditionally
adjudicatory procedures upon agencies engaged in informal
rulemaking has been the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in
Home Box Office, Inc. v. Federal Communication Commission.45
That case involved the validity of rules promulgated pursuant to
40. Comment, Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rule Making: The "Bread and Butter" of
Administrative Procedure, 27 EMORY L.J. 293, 295 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Ex Parte Contacts].
Absent a statute, usually the agency's organic law, requiring a decision "on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing," the determination of whether to hold oral argu-
ments lies within the discretion of the agency. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a) (1976). See e.g.,
Illinois v. NRC, 591 F.2d 12, 14 (7th Cir. 1979).
41. Section 553 rulemaking requires only that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant mat-
ter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement
of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
42. Comment, Ex Parte Contacts, supra note 40.
43. Id. For a more detailed discussion, see notes 101-115 infra and accompanying text.
44. Comment, Ex Parte Contacts, supra note 40, at 296. See also Writers Guild of
America, W., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355, 365 n.10 (9th Cir. 1979).
45. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). Factually, this case involved
the promulgation of rules regulating the cable television industry with respect to program-
ming policy similar to those previously imposed upon the subscription broadcast television
industry. Id. at 19-25. Several petitioners had unsuccessfully sought reconsideration of the
rules by the FCC on the ground that its decision was arbitrary and without adequate expla-
nation. Id. at 22. Following the Commission's refusal, the petitioners sought review by the
court of appeals.
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section 303 of the Communications Act.4' Because the Act did not
specify procedural safeguards, the Commission employed informal
rulemaking under section 553 of the APA.47
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Commission,
a participant had alleged violations of the ex parte communica-
tions doctrine set out in Sangamon Valley. On review before the
court of appeals, the Commission did not contest the allegation
that "a number of participants. . . sought out individual commis-
sioners or Commission employees for the purpose of discussing ex
parte and in confidence the merits of the rules .... In fact, the
Commission itself solicited such communications in its notices of
proposed rulemaking.... In response to the court's sua sponte
order, the Commission filed over sixty pages of documentation re-
vealing widespread ex parte contacts by virtually every party
before the court49 as well as members of Congress, members of the
trade press, and representatives of performing arts groups.5
The court's opinion, remanding the matter to the Commission,
appears to be a blanket ban against ex parte contacts in any ad-
ministrative proceeding. This condemnation is founded upon four
basic reasons: (1) the need for effective judicial review, (2) the pro-
motion of reasoned and fair decisionmaking, (3) the encourage-
ment of public discussion through the adversarial exchange of
views, and (4) the inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental no-
tions of fairness implicit in due process and the ideal of reasoned
decisionmaking on the merits.
The first reason for the court's ban was based upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
46. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
47. 567 F.2d at 35. See K. DAvis II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 534.
48. 567 F.2d at 51-52 (italics in original). The Commission's Notice of Proposed Rule
Making had stated that "[iln reaching a decision in this matter, the Commission may take
into account any other relevant information before it, in addition to the comments invited
by this Notice." 35 F.C.C.2d 893, 899 quoted in 567 F.2d at 55 n.122, 61 (italics in original).
49. 567 F.2d at 52. Many of these contacts had occurred during the period between the
close of oral argument and the adoption of the Commission's order at a time when the
record should have been closed while the proposed rules were under consideration by the
Commission. Id. at 53.
50. Id. at 52 n.109.
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Volpe,51 mandating that judicial review of agency actions was to be
based upon "the full administrative record" that was before the
agency at the time of the decision. Such record must disclose the
representations made to the agency in order that relevant informa-
tion supporting or rebutting them may be considered by a review-
ing court.
This course is obviously foreclosed if communications are made to
the agency in secret and the agency itself does not disclose the infor-
mation presented. Moreover, where, as here, an agency justifies its
actions by reference only to information in the public file while fail-
ing to disclose the substance of other relevant information that has
been presented to it, a reviewing court cannot presume that the
agency has acted properly... but must treat the agency's justifica-
tions as a fictional account of the actual decisionmaking process and
must perforce find its actions arbitrary."2
A second basis for the court's ban is that a decision on the part
of an agency to promulgate rules as a final event implies the as-
sumption that "an act of reasoned judgment has occurred." 53 This
assumption, stated the court, "contemplates the existence of a
body of material-documents, comments, transcripts, and state-
ments in various forms declaring agency expertise or policy-with
reference to which such judgment was exercised."' "5 The difficulty
posed by the existence of ex parte communications lies in the fact
that there is one administrative record for the public and a review-
ing court and another for the Commission and those originating
the ex parte communications. While recognizing that the Commis-
sion was engaged in informal rulemaking under section 553 of the
APA, the court, characterizing it as the law of the past, rejected
the notion that no administrative record is required in informal
rulemaking.55
The court further condemned the use of ex parte contacts be-
cause they deprive the administrative process of the advantages of
51. 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
52. 567 F.2d at 54-55 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 54.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 54 n.118. See also notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
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adversarial dialogue. Even assuming that the ex parte communica-
tions were disclosed during the process of judicial review, the truth
of what the Commission asserted it knew about the television in-
dustry would be difficult to determine. The court further noted
that in other instances agencies had been ordered to disclose infor-
mation in agency files or consultants' reports identified by the
agency as relevant in order to permit adversarial comment. "This
requirement not only allows adversarial critique of the agency but
is perhaps one of the few ways that the public may be apprised of
what the agency thinks it knows in its capacity as a repository of
expert opinion."56
From a functional standpoint, the court noted, there is no differ-
ence between assertions of fact and expert opinion offered by the
public and that generated internally. Both sources are subject to
bias, inaccuracy, or incompleteness which adversarial comment
would both illuminate and eliminate. "[T]he potential for bias in
private presentations in rulemakings which resolve 'conflicting pri-
vate claims to a valuable privilege,'. . . seems to us greater than in
cases where we have reversed agencies for failure to disclose inter-
nal studies."5
Finally, the court concluded that ex parte contacts and the se-
crecy accompanying them were inconsistent with "fundamental no-
tions of fairness implicit in due process and with the ideal of rea-
soned decisionmaking on the merits which undergirds all of our
administrative law."58 This inconsistency, the court stated, had
been recognized in Sangamon Valley, and any ambiquity as to the
applicability of that decision had been removed by recent congres-
sional and presidential actions."
56. 567 F.2d at 55. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
57. 567 F.2d at 55 (quoting Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d
221, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
58. 567 F.2d at 56.
59. In support of this assertion, the court referred to the recently enacted Government in
the Sunshine Act and Congress' declaration that it is "'the policy of the United States that
the public is entitled to the fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking
processes of the Federal Government.'" 567 F.2d at ... 56 (quoting Pub. L. No. 94-409,
§ 2, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976)). Of particular interest is the fact that the court acknowledged that
the Sunshine Act amendments to the APA pertain only to formal rulemaking and have no
application to informal rulemaking under section 553. Notwithstanding the recognition of
this crucial distinction, the court, earlier in its opinion, stated that the procedures in issue
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The court, in concluding its per curiam opinion, recognized that
"informal contacts between agencies and the public are the 'bread
and butter' of the process of administration and are completely ap-
propriate so long as they do not frustrate judicial review or raise
serious questions of fairness."60 Thus, the gist of Home Box Office
is that, once notice of proposed rulemaking is issued, any agency
official who may reasonably expect to be involved in the decisional
process should refuse to discuss matters relating to the merits with
any interested party. Additionally, the court would require that
any ex parte communications received after notice of agency action
must be placed in the public file so that interested parties may
comment."e Thus, the mischief which the court condemns is not so
much the existence of ex parte influences but, rather, the secrecy
surrounding thems2 for, as the court notes, the failure to publicly
disclose their existence together with reliance upon them by the
Commission reduces the elaborate public discussion in the
were governed by section 553. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
The court also referred to Exec. Order No. 11920, 12"WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc.
1040, 1041 (1976), prohibiting ex parte contacts with members of the White House staff
regarding allocation of international air routes. The court noted that this prohibition was
more on point than the Sunshine Act's since the President's actions under section 801 of the
Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. V 1974), were "clearly not adjudication, nor
even quasi-judicial." 567 F.2d at 57.
60. 567 F.2d at 57.
61. Id. While the opinion relies primarily upon Sangamon Valley and Executive Order
No. 11920, the procedure which the court would require in informal rulemaking is substan-
tially the same as that required in formal rulemaking under the Sunshine Act amendments
to the APA. For example, § 557(d)(1)(C) provides in part:
(C) a member of the body comprising the agency ... who receives ... a communica-
tion prohibited by this subsection shall place on the public record of the proceeding:
(i) all such written communications;
(ii) memoranda stating the substance of all such oral communications; and
(iii) all written responses, and memoranda stating the substance of all oral re-
sponses, to the materials described in clauses (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph[.]
5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1)(C) (1976). The application of this subsection to informal rulemaking,
however, is clearly contrary to congressional intent. See notes 35-39 supra and accompany-
ing text.
62. This conclusion is further borne out by the fact that the court distinguished the case
before it, as well as Sangamon Valley, from Courtaulds. In the latter case the court had
found "no evidence that the Commission improperly did anything in secret or gave to any
interested party advantages not shared by all." 567 F.2d at 56 n.124 (quoting Courtaulds
(Alabama) Inc. v. Dixon, 294 F.2d 899, 904-05 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (emphasis added)). In both
Sangamon Valley and Home Box Office, however, "the substance of the contacts [were]
kept secret." 567 F.2d at 56 n.124 (emphasis added).
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rulemaking proceedings to a "sham."6
V. Home Box Office: ITS VIABILITY CRITICIZED
Judges, agency officials, and legal commentators have criticized
Home Box Office's broad condemnation of ex parte communica-
tions. That decision is emblematic of one of the two concurrent
movements which have emerged in reviewing the sufficiency of
procedural protections under the APA; the opinion's critics gener-
ally represent the second, opposing trend. This second movement
has generally held the provisions of the APA to be sufficient to
protect the rights of interested parties in informal rulemaking."
Exemplary of this criticism is that of Judge MacKinnon, a member
of the judicial panel which decided the case. In a concurring
opinion specially filed, he had characterized the per curiam as "an
excessively broad statement [including] dictum that would be in-
terpreted to cover the entire universe of informal rulemaking."' 5
Judge MacKinnon also criticized the court's excessive reliance
upon Overton Park6 6 since in that case there had been a statutory
requirement that certain findings precede agency action thereby
making the full administrative record essential to judicial review;
no findings, however, were mandated by statute in the Home Box
Office proceedings.6 7 Furthermore, Judge MacKinnon points out
that the Commission's notice of rulemaking, including the provi-
sion regarding consideration of "any other relevant information,"6 8
signaled to the public the initiation of informal rulemaking pur-
suant to section 553(b) of the APA under which the Commission
was not required to follow the procedures applicable to formal
rulemaking or adjudications.6 9
63. 567 F.2d at 54.
64. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
65. 567 F.2d at 62 (MacKinnon, J., concurring specially).
66. See note 51 supra.
67. Judge MacKinnon states that:
[t]o the extent that our Per Curiam opinion relies upon Overton Park to support its
decision as to ex parte communications in this case, it is my view that it is exceeding
the authority it cites because here there is no statutory requirement for specific find-
ings nor are the regulations limited to the full administrative record.
567 F.2d at 62 (italics in original).
68. See note 48 supra.
69. 567 F.2d at 61-62.
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The holding of the per curiam was correct, however, in Judge
MacKinnon's view due to the fact that the rulemaking "involved
competitive interests of great monetary value and conferred pref-
erential advantages on vast segments of the broadcast industry to
the detriment" of competitors.70 Thus, the rulemaking was, in ef-
fect, an adjudication of the respective rights of the parties. For
that reason, Judge MacKinnon would have reached the same result
by applying the doctrine enunciated in Sangamon Valley rather
than impose a prohibition on ex parte contacts as broad as that
enunciated in the per curiam.7 1
Professor Davis has also been critical of Home Box Office gener-
ally for the same reason enunciated by Judge MacKinnon, namely,
that the opinion goes beyond the narrow grounds necessary to
reach its conclusion. Davis maintains that:
every reason the court gave in support of the prohibition would have
been satisfied by a holding that such consultations and any other
communications are permitted but must go into the public record so
that (a) others may have a chance to reply, and (b) a reviewing court
may know what the agency has considered.7 2
Furthermore, he contends that the court's reliance on Sangamon
Valley was improper because that case involved "primarily
rulemaking and incidentally adjudication." The Home Box Office
70. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
71. In fact, many situations exist where such a rule would be inappropriate:
Informal written or oral consultation with affected parties or with advisory commit-
tees is the mainstay of rule-making procedure.
The consultative process may take many forms. The administrator or staff member
may talk over possible rules with selected parties, by telephone or in person, singly or
in groups, by systematically and formally arranged conferences or interviews or in
connection with fortuitous contacts occasioned by other business.
The Attorney General's Committee generalized concerning conferences: 'The prac-
tice . . . introduces an element of give-and-take . . . and affords an assurance to
those in attendance that their evidence and points of view are known and will be
considered. As a procedure for permitting private interests to participate .. .it is as
definite and may be as adequate as a formal hearing.'
567 F.2d at 62-63 n.2 (quoting K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATiv LAW TREATISE § 6.02, at 363-65
(1958)) (footnotes omitted).
72. K. DAVIS II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 533-34.
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case, on the other hand, was "entirely rulemaking. 73
For this reason, Davis asserts that better authority existed upon
which to resolve the case. First, there was the United Air Lines74
case which Davis notes was an adjudication. In that case, the ad-
ministrative decision was not invalidated since the ex parte com-
munications had been placed in the public file. Davis asserts that
"[i]f placing the communications in the public file is enough even
in an adjudication, it should be enough in rulemaking. 75
The court might also have relied upon Courtaulds76 where the
Commission had not given any party an advantage not shared by
all. Courtaulds had relied upon Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v.
United States7 7 which had found that ex parte contacts with the
FCC during a general nation-wide rulemaking procedure were not
improper. The Home Box Office opinion, however, did not mention
Van Curler but, instead, distinguished Courtauds.78 Davis, how-
ever, maintains that, despite this fact, Home Box Office and Cour-
taulds "in their fundamental attitudes seem clearly irreconcil-
able. '79 Thus, if the Home Box Office panel had relied upon
Courtaulds, it could have reached the same decision by finding
that there was secrecy surrounding the ex parte contacts or that
advantages were given to some, but not all, interested parties.
Davis also criticizes the court's characterization of the public
hearings held by the Commission as a "sham." He points out that
the court's failure was its reliance upon "patterns of adjudication"
rather than "patterns of legislation to guide the legislative proce-
73. Id. at 534. Davis notes that while Sangamon Valley dealt with allocation of television
channels it also involved a resolution of claims to a particular license. Thus, with respect to
the applications for the license there was an adjudication and hence the resolution of "com-
peting private claims to a valuable privilege."
74. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
75. K. DAvis II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 535.
76. See notes 13-20 supra and accompanying text.
77. 236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 935 (1956).
78. Courtaulds was distinguished because the court had not found that anything had
been done in secret nor had interested parties received advantages not shared by all. It was
also distinguished by the fact that the agency "did not decide competing private claims to a
valuable privilege." 567 F.2d at 56 n.124. See also Rogers Communication Serv., Inc. v. FCC,
593 F.2d 1225, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
79. K. DAvis II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 535.
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dure of rulemaking."80
Thus, Davis' conclusion is that the result reached could have
been based on much narrower grounds than those relied upon.
While Home Box Office may be valid law in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, he notes that it is unlikely to derive much support in
other jurisdictions or in the law of the future."'
VI. Action for Children's Television: ANOTHER PANEL SPEAKS
Subsequent to Home Box Office, one commentator has argued
that the prevention of unfairness to other interested parties in in-
formal rulemaking could be achieved by means far short of those
adopted in that opinion. Its objective could have been achieved ei-
ther by "careful regard for the application of the Sangamon princi-
ple" or by requiring that ex parte communications dealing with the
merits be placed in the public file.82 These considerations sug-
gested that a general ban on ex parte contacts is unnecessary. Fur-
thermore, many commentators have argued that such a ban would
be undesirable.8 3
Less than four months following the decision in Home Box Of-
fice, its shortcomings were made amply clear by a different panel
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Action for Children's Television v. Federal Communications Com-
mission [hereinafter cited as ACT]. 8 The court's opinion, in the
words of one commentator, "carefully considers and explicitly re-
jects the general position taken . . . in Home Box Office."185 Al-
though factually the cases are distinguishable," they are alike in
80. Id. at 534. "If Congress considers a bill ... would the court call the public discus-
sions a sham if lobbyists talk to some congressman before the votes are taken? Or is compe-
tition of the lobbyists with each other often the essence of democracy." Id.
81. See id. at 533, 537.
82. Nathanson, supra note 20, at 399-400.
83. See, e.g., id., K. DAvis II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 537; Recommendation 77-3, 1977
REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATrm CONFERENCE OF TEE UNITED STATES (1978).
84. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Judge MacKinnon, who had filed a separate opinion
concurring specially in Home Box Office, was the only member common to both panels.
85. Nathanson, supra note 20, at 400.
86. Home Box Office had considered the FCC's promulgation of rules, while ACT re-
viewed the Commission's decision not to promulgate rules. Action for Children's Television
[hereinafter Action], a public-interest organization, had petitioned the Commission for
adoption of numerous proposals to improve children's television. Following proper public
1980]
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that they examine ex parte communications in the context of infor-
mal agency action.
In rejecting the ex parte contacts challenge to the Commission's
decision not to promulgate certain regulations proposed by Action
for Children's Television, the court stated that the petitioner's
characterization of the Commission's action as an abuse of admin-
istrative process "misconceives the agency's role in, and the flex-
ibility of, the informal rulemaking proceeding" through which the
petitioner's proposals were explored.87 Beyond the procedural re-
quirements of the APA, the court stated, Congress had not speci-
fied any other method by which the Commission was to acquire
and assess data relevant to its determination of the public inter-
est.88 The court recognized that, in this case, the Commission was
engaged in a legislative determination where only limited proce-
dural safeguards were required to permit meaningful public
participation.
The procedures available . . . are correspondingly diverse .... No
hearing is usually required, and generally no procedural uniformity
is imposed. The more limited procedural safeguards in informal
rulemaking are justified by its more wide-ranging functional empha-
sis on questions of law, policy and legislatively-conferred discretion
rather than on the contested facts of an individual case.ss
The court also pointed out that, under section 553 of the APA, the
Commission was not limited to factual material within the public
domain but could employ its own expertise or broader policy con-
siderations not present in the record.90
notice of inquiry and proposed rulemaking, and in the wake of strong public support for the
proposals, the broadcast industry undertook limited self-regulation. For that reason, the
Commission declined further consideration of Action's proposals. Action challenged this de-
cision on grounds that the Commission had failed to solicit public comment on the indus-
try's self-regulation which had been "negotiated behind the closed doors" of the Commis-
sion with the National Association of Broadcasters. 564 F.2d at 468.
87. Id. at 469.
88. Id. at 470 n.19.
89. Id. at 471 (citations omitted). The court's recognition of the APA as the limit of pro-
cedural protections is emblematic of the second movement, referred to earlier, that is cur-
rently developing in administrative law. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text.
90. The Commission's Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Home Box Office and its No-
tice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making in ACT are alike in that they provide for con-
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In considering the ex parte contacts challenge, the ACT panel
was not unmindful of Home Box Office "which painted a new per-
spective on ex parte contacts with a rather broad jurisprudential
brush."91 Although not overruling that decision, the court refused
to apply its rule regarding ex parte communications9 2 retroactively
in ACT. The panel agreed that the ex parte contact prohibition
mandated by Home Box Office "should not apply-as the opinion
clearly would have it-to every case of informal rulemaking.., as
it constitutes a clear departure from established law ... ",3
The court, in a footnote, pointed out that, if Congress had
wanted to extend the ex parte prohibition to informal rulemaking,
it had a perfect opportunity to do so with the passage of the Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act. More importantly, the court refers to
the language of section 555(b) of the APA which "can reasonably
be read as sanctioning ex parte contacts" if "consistent with 'the
orderly conduct of public business.' ",94 While the Home Box Office
panel had relied upon recent presidential and congressional actions
to support an extension of the Sangamon Valley doctrine, the
court here asserted that such reliance "is rendered nugatory by
what Congress chose not to do."' 95 Furthermore, the ACT case was
distinguishable from Sangamon Valley because of the absence of
competing private claims to a valuable privilege. ACT concerned a
question of programming policy of general applicability which was
beyond the scope of Sangamon Valley."6 The court also noted the
sideration of matters other than those in the public domain. Compare 35 F.C.C.2d 893, 899,
quoted in 567 F.2d at 55 n.122, 61, with 28 F.C.C.2d 368, 372-73, quoted in 564 F.2d at 471
n.22.
91. 564 F.2d at 474.
92. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
93. 564 F.2d at 474.
94. Id. at 474-75 n.28. Section 555(b), which is applicable by § 555(a) to §§ 551-59, states
in pertinent part: "So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, an interested
person may appear before an agency or its responsible employees for the presentation, ad-
justment, or determination of an issue... in a proceeding, .. or in connection with an
agency function." 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1976).
95. 564 F.2d at 474-75 n.28.
96. The court looked to the Home Box Office opinion's reasoning in reaching this conclu-
sion. A major problem which the Home Box Office panel confronted was the Courtaulds
case, which it distinguished from both the case before it and Sangamon Valley. First, unlike
Courtaulds, the substance of the ex parte contacts had been secret. Secondly, Courtaulds
did not involve competing claims to a valuable privilege. "[T]hese bases for distinguishing
Courtaulds from Home Box Office also distinguish [ACT] with the same and perhaps even
1980]
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absence of any reference in Home Box Office to the Van Curler7
case, which had supported the proposition that ex parte contacts
do not per se vitiate informal rulemaking unless the administrative
record demonstrates that they had been a material influence in the
agency decision. 8
The ACT panel also rejected Home Box Office's requirement of a
"whole record" judicial review together with the notion that such
review must be based on every informational input that may have
been involved in the deliberative process. Such a requirement, the
court held, would place tremendous burdens on an agency deci-
sionmaker in making available such a record and could potentially
be carried to the point of absurdity.99
As the court concluded, the problem was one of line-drawing. In
consideration of that which Congress did not intend, this panel of
the court drew that line at the point where rulemaking proceedings
involve "competing claims to a valuable privilege." Thus, the ACT
opinion merely reaffirms what Sangamon Valley had held almost
twenty years earlier and rejects the extension of that rule to all
informal rulemaking as Home Box Office would require. 10
VII. Vermont Yankee: GUIDING LIGHT OR DICTUM?
The decision in ACT, however, has not been the final word on ex
parte contacts or procedural rights in informal rulemaking pro-
ceedings. Although not directly addressing the question of ex parte
influence, the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
greater force." 564 F.2d at 476. What is baffling, however, is the fact that the Home Box
Office panel, after distinguishing Courtaulds, "effectively overrule[s]" that case by promul-
gating its broad ban on ex parte contacts. Id. at 476 n.29. See also 567 F.2d at 56 n.124, 57.
97. 236 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 935 (1956).
98. 564 F.2d at 476.
99. Regarding the degree to which the "whole record" requirement could be carried to the
absurd, the court states:
If we go as far as Home Box Office ... why not go further to require the deci-
sionmaker to summarize and make available for public comment every status inquiry
from a Congressman or any germane material-say a newspaper editorial-that he or
she reads or their evening-hour ruminations? In the end, why not administer a lie-
detector test to ascertain whether the required summary is an accurate and complete
one?
564 F.2d at 477 (citation omitted).
100. Id.; Hoffman-Laroche, Inc. v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D.D.C. 1978).
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in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,101 reviewing rulemaking procedures under
section 553 of the APA, has had some bearing on the issue in more
recent cases.102
Even though the Atomic Energy Commission had employed all
the procedures required by the APA, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit overturned the rules promulgated,
and held that, in the absence of proper rulemaking procedures, the
Commission must review the environmental impact of fuel
reprocessing and disposal in individual licensing proceedings, i.e.,
on a case-by-case basis.103 Although the court had not dictated ad-
herence to any specific procedures, it had discussed the need for
more extensive procedural devices, particularly discovery and
cross-examination which the Commission had denied. This, the
court held, amounted inter alia to a deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to participate as guaranteed by due process.104
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the court of appeals
decison, finding it contrary to both judicial holdings of over four
decades and congressional determinations that administrative
agencies are in a better position than federal courts or Congress
101. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The case involved the issuance of a license to operate a nuclear
power plant and the promulgation of rules concerning the environmental effects associated
with the uranium fuel cycle by the Atomic Energy Commission. The National Resources
Defense Council challenged these rules on procedural grounds because of the Commission's
decision that "the hearing [would] follow the legislative pattern, and no discovery or cross-
examination [would] be utilized.... The hearing [would] be conducted as informally and
as expeditiously as practicable, consistent with affording, the participants a reasonable op-
portunity to present their positions." Notice of Hearing, 38 FED. REG. 49, 49-50 (1973).
Judicial review of the rulemaking was originally sought in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. That court had framed the issue as "whether the procedures
provided by the agency were sufficient to ventilate the issues." Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
102. Nathanson concludes that the opinion "may have far-reaching implications, not only
for ex parte communications but also with respect to many other procedural problems aris-
ing in the course of informal rulemaking." Nathanson, supra note 20, at 406. Furthermore, if
the opinion "is taken literally and given full scope, it is hard to see why it would not be
equally applicable to the problem of ex parte communications in informal rulemaking." Id.
at 407. Accord, Citizens Assoc- of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n. of the District of Colum-
bia, 392 A.2d 1027 (D.C. 1978). But see K. DAvis II, supra note 11, §§ 6:36 to :37.
103. 435 U.S. at 535.
104. Id. at 541-42.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
"to design procedural rules adapted to the peculiarities of the...
tasks of the agency involved."1 05 The decision stands in remarkable
contrast to the Home Box Office opinion's importation of tradition-
ally adjudicatory procedures into informal rulemaking. In apparent
agreement with the view that the APA sets out the maximum pro-
cedural rights required, the Court stated with respect to informal
rulemaking under section 553 that
generally speaking this section of the Act established the maximum
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exer-
cise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free
to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.,,"
This mandate, however, is not absolute but is applicable "[a]bsent
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circum-
stances.
'107
One such exceptional circumstance to which the Court intimated
is not unlike that considered in Sangamon Valley. The Court
noted that, even though an agency is engaged in rulemaking pro-
ceedings, additional procedures beyond those compelled by the
APA may be required if the agency is making a "quasi-judicial"
determination exceptionally affecting a small number of persons in
which each case is decided upon individual grounds.108 This stan-
dard is substantially similar to that of Sangamon Valley, i.e.,
105. Id. at 524-25. Perhaps the significance of Vermont Yankee is suggested by the
Court's explanation of its grant of certiorari:
As we read the opinion of the Court of Appeals, its view that reviewing courts may
in the absence of special circumstances justifying such a course of action impose addi-
tional procedural requirements on agency action raises questions of such significance
in this area of the law as to warrant our granting certiorari and deciding the case.
Since the vast majority of challenges to administrative agency action are brought to
... the District of Columbia Circuit, the decision of that court in this case will serve
as precedent for many more proceedings for judicial review of agency actions than
would the decision of another Court of Appeals.
Id. at 535-37 n.14.
106. Id. at 524 (citing United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), and
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972)) (emphasis added).
107. 435 U.S. at 543.
108. Id. at 542. See also United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 242, 245; Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915).
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"competing private claims to a valuable privilege" which triggers a
prohibition against ex parte communications.
The Court rejected the argument that section 553 of the APA
established only the lower procedural bounds beyond which courts
may routinely require additional safeguards when an agency ad-
dresses complex or technical factual issues or topics of great public
import. Noting that the legislative history of the APA was clearly
contrary to that position,10° the Court referred to several compel-
ling reasons dictating against court imposed procedures. First, ju-
dicial review of agency rulemaking would be totally unpredictable
if courts review proceedings to determine whether the procedures
employed were "perfectly tailored" to reach the result which the
court feels is "best" or "correct." Secondly, a court's review of the
procedures employed is based on the record actually produced at
the rulemaking hearing rather than on the basis of information
available to the agency at the time when the decision was made to
tailor the procedural structure as it did. Finally, and as the Court
states, "most importantly," in informal rulemaking it cannot be as-
sumed that additional procedures will result in a more adequate
record; "informal rulemaking need not be based solely on the tran-
script of a hearing held before an agency." 110 Any requirement
mandating procedures beyond those of section 553, in effect, "com-
pels the agency to conduct all rulemaking proceedings with the full
panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with adju-
dicatory hearings. '
The Supreme Court, then, has apparently condemned the impor-
tation of traditionally adjudicatory procedures into informal
agency rulemaking. Whether Vermont Yankee will have any signif-
icant effect upon future judicial review of ex parte communications
109. The Senate Report pertaining to § 553 as originally enacted asserts the following:
This subsection states... the minimum requirements of public rule making proce-
dure short of statutory hearings. Under it agencies might in addition confer with
industry advisory committees, consult organizations, hold informal 'hearings,' and
the like. Considerations of practicality, necessity, and public interest. . . will natu-
rally govern the agency's determination of the extent to which public proceedings
should go.
435 U.S. at 545 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1945)) (emphasis
added). Accord, H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 16-17 (1946).
110. 435 U.S. at 546-47.
111. Id. at 547.
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is still open to question. One commentator has questioned whether
the decision will have as far-reaching effects as the face of the
opinion would seem to dictate.11 2 The decision, however, has been
given considerable deference by some courts.113
At least one decision has expressly rejected not only the ex parte
prohibition of Home Box Office but also that of ACT based upon
authority of Vermont Yankee. In Citizens Association of George-
town v. Zoning Commission of the District of Columbia,1 1 4 the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed a zoning plan es-
tablished by rulemaking proceedings which had been challenged
because of ex parte influences. After distinguishing the case from
Sangamon Valley and Home Box Office by reason of the absence
of "competing claims to a valuable privilege," the court stated that
"subsequent decisions have cast doubt on the continuing vitality of
Home Box Office.... Furthermore, even the limited application
of a judicial rule of procedure, such as that set forth in Home Box
Office and ACT, to an administrative rulemaking is questionable"
112. Davis asserts that the broad language of the opinion "was probably intended to be
no broader than the problem before the Court," which was the application of adjudicatory
procedures in informal rulemaking. He points out that the problem before the Court. failed
to bring into question as many as a dozen other issues including the problem of "what to do
about ex parte communications in informal rulemaking, not mentioned by § 553." K. DAvis
II, supra note 11, § 6:36, at 609-10. But see B. MESINES, J. STmN, & J. GRUFF, ADmNmisTRA-
TvE LAW §§ 1.0412], 18.05 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
In a later article, Davis severely criticizes the Vermont Yankee opinion. He notes that the
Court, in reaching its conclusions, proceeds to do precisely that which it condemns, namely,
to engage in the creation of what he calls "administrative common law." Davis, however,
contends that the Court has itself created much administrative common law throughout the
twentieth century and notes that Vermont Yankee is contrary to both the APA and its
legislative history. Finally, Davis contends that the opinion will be rejected in the long run
and that it already appears to be eroding in its effects. Davis, Administrative Common Law
and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3.
113. See, e.g., Illinois v. NRC, 591 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1979); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 44
Ad.L.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589
F.2d 1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). See also Comment, Judicial Imposition of
Rulemaking Procedures on Administrative Agencies: The Impact of Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 28 DEPAuL L. Rv.
171 (1978).
114. 392 A-2d 1027 (D.C. 1978). The ex parte contacts in question included breakfast and
lunch meetings with Commission members and the submission of complete drafts of zoning
regulations and map amendments by land developers, none of which were placed in or sum-
marized by the public file.
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in the wake of Vermont Yankee.11 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has confronted at least two cases involving ex parte com-
munications since the decision in Vermont Yankee. 11e These deci-
sions, unlike those previously considered in this comment, did not
involve informal rulemaking under section 553 of the APA, nor did
they involve a statutory mandate that "hearings on the record" be
conducted pursuant to sections 556 and 557. In United States
Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission,117 the court consid-
ered ex parte contacts in the context of a statutory requirement
that the Commission conduct "hearings." Rejecting the argument
that formal adjudicatory-type hearings were required under sec-
tions 556 and 557 of the APA since the Shipping Act mandated
only a decision after "notice and hearing," 1 8 the court nevertheless
concluded that the ex parte contacts vitiated the agency decision.
The court reasoned that since the public had a right to participate
in the required hearing, the existence of ex parte contacts reduced
the hearings to "nothing more than a sham" since the right "em-
braces... a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the op-
posing party."1 9 As in Home Box Office, the ex parte contacts were
115. 392 A.2d at 1040-41. Evidently, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would not
extend the prohibition against ex parte contacts as far as the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit did in ACT where an agency's informal rulemak-
ing involved resolution of conflicting claims to a valuable privilege. Apparently, this court
would go only so far as required by the District of Columbia APA, which is similar to the
Federal APA.
116. United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n., 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir.
1978); National Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. ICC, 44 Ad. L.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
117. 584 F.2d 519. The Federal Maritime Commission had granted an exemption from the
antitrust laws for anti-competitive agreements among certain ocean carriers pursuant to sec-
tion 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970). Ex parte communications were
received by the Commission from foreign governments but were not disclosed in the public
record.
118. Noting that neither § 15 of the Shipping Act nor its legislative history provided for a
hearing "on the record," the court stated that
[w]hile the exact phrase 'on the record' is not an absolute prerequisite to application
of the formal hearing requirements, the Supreme Court has made clear that these
provisions [sections 556 and 557 of the APA] do not apply unless Congress has clearly
indicated that the 'hearing' required by statute must be a trial-type hearing on the
record.
584 F.2d at 536. See also Marketing Assistance Program, Inc., v. Bergland, 562 F.2d 1305,
1309 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
119. 584 F.2d at 539.
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found to stand between the court and effective judicial review
which, regardless of the standard of review, requires the court to
test the agency action against" 'the full administrative record that
was before [the Commission] at the time [of the] decision.' "120
The court apparently circumvents Vermont Yankee by noting
that the Supreme Court had remanded that case to the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of conducting a "searching and careful"
inquiry of the type mandated by Overton Park to determine
agency compliance with the applicable standard of review. The
court concluded that its prohibition of ex parte contacts in the case
before it was not based upon a determination of "which procedures
are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined public
good," but rather upon statutory requirements of a hearing and
upon judicial review under the standard which Congress chose to
impose. 121
VIII. CONCLUSION
Whether the Home Box Office prohibition against ex parte com-
munications in informal rulemaking will remain viable in the fu-
ture is open to question. The very existence of such a broad pro-
scription, at least within the District of Columbia Circuit, seems
dependent upon the particular panel reviewing the agency action
in question.1 22
Not only has another panel of the same court that decided Home
Box Office been critical of its proscription, but the Administrative
Conference of the United States has rejected its holding. In regard
to ex parte contacts in section 553 rulemaking, the Conference has
stated:
A general prohibition applicable to all agencies ... is undesirable,
because it would deprive agencies of the flexibility needed to fashion
120. Id. at 541 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc, v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
420 (1971)).
121. 584 F.2d at 542-43 n.63.
122. Davis states that Home Box Office "may be momentarily the law of the D. C. Circuit
because of the vote of two judges out of three." K. DAvis II, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 533. Of
the two judges, one was a district judge sitting by designation, the other was Circuit Judge
Wright. 567 F.2d at 17. Of interest is Judge Wright's authorship of the United States Lines
opinion, 584 F.2d at 522, and his absence from the ACT panel, 564 F.2d at 461.
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rulemaking procedures appropriate to the issues involved, and
would introduce a degree of formality that would, at least in most
instances, result in procedures that are unduly complicated, slow
and expensive, and, at the same time, perhaps not conducive to de-
veloping all relevant information.1
2 3
In view of the ACT decision and depending upon the applicability
of Vermont Yankee to the ex parte contact issue, it is not likely
that the law of the future will prohibit ex parte influences in the
making of rules of general applicability. It is, however, likely that
courts will require that significant contacts be included in the pub-
lic record.124
123. Recommendation 77-3, 1977 REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES (1978).
124. See id.; K. DAVIS I, supra note 11, § 6:18, at 537.
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